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INTERVAL VALUED BIMATRIX GAMES
Milan Hlad́ık
Payoffs in (bimatrix) games are usually not known precisely, but it is often possible
to determine lower and upper bounds on payoffs. Such interval valued bimatrix games
are considered in this paper. There are many questions arising in this context. First, we
discuss the problem of existence of an equilibrium being common for all instances of interval
values. We show that this property is equivalent to solvability of a certain linear mixed
integer system of equations and inequalities. Second, we characterize the set of all possible
equilibria by mean of a linear mixed integer system.
Keywords: bimatrix game, interval matrix, interval analysis
Classification: 91A05, 91A15, 90C11
NOTATION
e a vector of all ones (with convenient dimension)
ek the kth basis vector (with convenient dimension), i. e.,
the kth column of the identity matrix
x ≤ y, A ≤ B,
A < B, . . .
vector and matrix relations are understood
componentwise
Ai,. the ith row of a matrix A
1. INTRODUCTION
Competitive situations arise in many part of real life and game theory gives a mathe-
matical background for dealing with such conflicting events. There are diverse kinds
of mathematical games; we focus on matrix games.
A bimatrix game [12, 13] is a two player game, each of them has finite number of
strategies. The payoff function is determined by two matrices A,B ∈ Rm×n. When
player I chooses the ith strategy and player II his jth strategy then aij and bij are
payoffs of the player I and II, respectively. Thus, a bimatrix game is determined by
a pair of matrices (A,B). Rational behavior of players is assumed, that is, each of
them attempts to maximize his/her reward.
An equilibrium point in pure strategies needn’t exist, so we have to consider
mixed strategies. Mixed strategy is a probability vector over a set of pure strategies.
That is, a mixed strategy for player I is a vector x ∈ Rm, x ≥ 0, eTx = 1. Likewise,
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a mixed strategy for player II is a vector y ∈ Rn, y ≥ 0, eT y = 1. Now, the expected
reward for player I and II is xTAy and xTBy, respectively. A pair of mixed strategies
(x̂, ŷ) is called (Nash) equilibrium if
x̂TAŷ ≥ xTAŷ,
x̂TBŷ ≥ x̂TBy
for any mixed strategy x and y. In other words, no player has a motivation to change
his/her strategy. In mixed strategies, at least one equilibrium always exists [9].
Equilibria can be computed by solving a linear complementarity problem [14],
however, for our purposes it is more convenient to use the following result by Audet
et al. [3]. It says that equilibria corresponds one-to-one to solutions of a particular
mixed integer programming problem. Note that variables α and β are respectively












The set of equilibria is the set of mixed strategies (x, y) for which there are α, β ∈ R
and vectors u ∈ {0, 1}m and v ∈ {0, 1}n satisfying
eTx = 1, x ≥ 0, (1)
eT y = 1, y ≥ 0, (2)
αe− L(A)u ≤ Ay ≤ αe, (3)
βe− L(B)v ≤ BTx ≤ βe, (4)
x+ u ≤ e, (5)
y + v ≤ e. (6)
In many economical situations the payoffs are not known precisely. Uncertainty in
mathematical problems can be dealt by various ways. An interval-based approach is
considered in this papers. Herein, we assume that we have lower and upper bounds
on the imprecise data. Such interval-valued games have already been studied in
the recent years. Yager & Kreinovich [15] showed how fair division under interval
uncertainty can be performed. Zero-sum interval matrix games were considered by
Liu & Kao [8], Collins & Hu [4, 5, 6], Levin [7], and by Shashikhin [11]. While the
former authors Liu & Kao discussed the range of possible payoffs, the others solved
the interval problem by imposing a binary relation on intervals. Cooperation under
interval uncertainty was dealt with by Alparslan-Gök et al. [1, 2].
To the best of our knowledge, bimatrix games with interval-valued entries has
never been investigated. To formalize the problem, we define an interval matrix [10]
to be a family of matrices
A := [A,A] = {A ∈ Rm×n | aij ≤ aij ≤ aij ∀ i, j},
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where A,A ∈ Rm×n are given matrices. An interval matrix B is defined by analogy.
For more results on linear systems with interval values see e. g. Rohn [10]. In fact, we
were inspired by his approach to handle (1) – (6). Nevertheless, the direct utilization
is not possible as (1) – (6) incurs some discrete variables and dependencies (double
appearance of A and B).
By an instance we mean a bimatrix game (A,B) with certain A ∈ A and B ∈ B.
Surprisingly, not always the maximal payoffs (entries of A and B) result in real





















The corresponding rewards are respectively 5, 1 and 52 for both players. The first
equilibrium dominates the others, so rational behavior of the players should tend
to the first equilibrium with the maximal reward 5. However, the game (A,B) has
only one equilibrium (e2, e2) and both players earn merely 1.
2. EQUILIBRIUM PRESERVATION
A natural question is whether there exists a pair of mixed strategies which forms
an equilibrium being common for all instances of interval data. Such an equilibrium
is called strong equilibrium. How to check its existence? And what are properties
of the corresponding strategies? First, we observe that the strategies must be pure
provided we perturb all matrix entries.
Proposition 1. Let (x̂, ŷ) is a strong equilibrium. If A < A then x̂ is a pure
strategy. If B < B then ŷ is a pure strategy.
P r o o f . For contradiction and without loss of generality assume that the first two
components of x̂, x̂1 and x̂2, are positive. Put A :=
1
2 (A − A). By definition of
equilibrium, x̂1Aŷ = x̂2Aŷ. Perturbing the first row of A, however, the equation will
not hold true. That is, (x̂, ŷ) is not equilibrium when we change A to A+εe1e
T with
ε > 0 small enough. That contradicts the assumption. Likewise for the strategy ŷ
of player II. 
Under the assumption of Proposition 1 any strong equilibrium must consist of
pure strategies only. Thus it suffices to inspect all combinations of pure strategies and
check if they form a strong equilibrium. The following statement gives instructions
for this approach.
Theorem 2 (Strong equilibrium in pure strategies). There exists a strong equilib-
rium in pure strategies if and only if there is some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that
aij ≥ akj ∀ k = 1, . . . ,m, k 6= i, (7)
bij ≥ bik ∀ k = 1, . . . , n, k 6= j. (8)
In this case, (ei, ej) is a strong equilibrium.
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P r o o f . Let A ∈ A and let B ∈ B and (7) – (8) be true. Then aij ≥ aij ≥ akj ≥ akj
for all k 6= i. That is, eTi Aej ≥ eTkAej for all k 6= i and hence eTi Aej ≥ xTAej for
any mixed strategy x. Likewise one can show that eTi Bej ≥ eTi By for any mixed
strategy y. Therefore (ei, ej) is an equilibrium.
Conversely, let (ei, ej) be a strong equilibrium. Then e
T
i Aej ≥ xTAej must be
true for any A ∈ A and any mixed strategy x. Put aij := aij and akj := akj for
k = 1, . . . ,m, k 6= i; the other entries can be chosen arbitrarily. Next, put x := ek
for k 6= i. Then the inequality reads aij ≥ akj and holds true for any k 6= i. This
proves (7), and the second relation (8) can be proven analogously. 
Now, we know how to check if there exists a strong equilibrium in pure strategies.
The method proposed by Theorem 2 is easily computable and can be implemented
in time complexity O(mn) (simply for each row of B and column of A find the two
largest entries and then compare candidates only with them). Below in Theorem 4,
we propose an existence test for a strong equilibrium in mixed strategies that are











and adapt Theorem 1 accordingly:
Theorem 3. For any A ∈ A and let B ∈ B the equilibria set to the game (A,B)
is described by all pairs (x, y) for which there are α, β ∈ R and vectors u ∈ {0, 1}m
and v ∈ {0, 1}n satisfying
eTx = 1, x ≥ 0, (9)
eT y = 1, y ≥ 0, (10)
αe− L(A)u ≤ Ay ≤ αe, (11)
βe− L(B)v ≤ BTx ≤ βe, (12)
x+ u ≤ e, (13)
y + v ≤ e. (14)
P r o o f . We show that systems (1) – (6) and (9) – (14) are equivalent. Every solution
to the first system is also a solution to the second one since L(A) ≤ L(A) and
L(B) ≤ L(B).
Conversely, let x, y, u, v, α, β be any solution of (9) – (14). Then it solves (1) – (6)
possibly except the left inequalities in (3) – (4). Consider the ith left inequality in
(3). If ui = 0 then it is satisfied trivially. If ui = 1 then this inequality reads
α−Ai,.y ≤ L(A).
As α ≤ maxi,j (aij) and Ai,.y ≥ mini,j (aij), the inequality is fulfilled. Similarly we
show that the remaining inequalities are satisfied. 
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Theorem 4 (Strong equilibrium in non-pure strategies). A pair of mixed non-
pure strategies (x̂, ŷ) is a strong equilibrium if and only if there are some α̂, β̂ ∈ R,
û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n such that they solve the system
eTx = 1, x ≥ 0, (15)
eT y = 1, y ≥ 0, (16)
αe− L(A)u ≤ Ay, Ay ≤ αe, (17)
βe− L(B)v ≤ BTx, BTx ≤ βe, (18)
x+ u ≤ e, (19)
y + v ≤ e. (20)
P r o o f . One implication is easily observed. Let x̂ ∈ Rm, ŷ ∈ Rn, α̂, β̂ ∈ R,
û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n be a solution of the system (15) – (20), and let A ∈ A
and B ∈ B be arbitrarily chosen. Then due to non-negativity of ŷ we have
α̂e− L(A)û ≤ Aŷ ≤ Aŷ ≤ Aŷ ≤ α̂e,
and likewise
β̂e− L(B)v̂ ≤ BT x̂ ≤ BT x̂ ≤ BT x̂ ≤ β̂e.
Hence x̂, ŷ, α̂, β̂ ∈ R, û and v̂ form a solution to the system (9) – (14), and therefore
(x̂, ŷ) is an equilibrium to any bimatrix game (A,B) with A ∈ A and B ∈ B.
To show the converse implication, we define I(x̂) := {i | x̂i > 0} and I(ŷ) := {i |
ŷi > 0}. We claim that aij = aij and bij = bij for every i ∈ I(x̂) and j ∈ I(ŷ). As x̂
is not pure strategy, I(x̂) contains more than one element. Thus, for any i1, i2 ∈ I(x̂)
and any A ∈ A we have eTi1Aŷ = eTi2Aŷ. This equation will not be true when we
perturb any ai1j or ai2j with j ∈ I(ŷ). That is why aij = aij holds for every i ∈ I(x̂)
and j ∈ I(ŷ). Likewise the second equation.
Let A ∈ A and B ∈ B. By Theorem 3 there are some α̂, β̂ ∈ R, û ∈ {0, 1}m
and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n satisfying (9) – (14). Obviously, x̂i > 0 implies ûi = 0. For x̂i = 0
we can assume that ûi = 1 (if ûi = 0, then also ûi = 1 solves the system). Let
i ∈ I(x̂). Then (11) implies α̂ ≤ (Aŷ)i ≤ α̂, i. e., α̂ = (Aŷ)i. As aij is constant for
every i ∈ I(x̂), j ∈ I(ŷ) and A ∈ A we obtain that the reward α̂ of player I is the
same for all instances. Thus x̂, ŷ, α̂, β̂, û and v̂ solve (9) – (14) for every A ∈ A and
B ∈ B. Particularly, for A := A we get α̂e − L(A)û ≤ Aŷ, and for A := A we get
Aŷ ≤ α̂e. Hence (17) is satisfied, (18) holds accordingly, and the other equations
and inequalities are satisfied trivially. 
We should give some explanation to Theorem 4. Any non-pure strong equilibrium
is described by (15) – (20). Conversely, any solution to the system gives some strong
equilibrium, which is not necessary in non-pure strategies. That is, system (15) – (20)
describes all non-pure strong equilibria and possibly some others strong equilibria.
In general, not all strong equilibria are included there. Analogous remark could be
given for Theorem 5 below.
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Proof of Theorem 4 also shows what are rewards for the players. Let x̂, ŷ, α̂, β̂,
û and v̂ be a solution of the system (15) – (20). Then for every A ∈ A and B ∈ B
the pair (x̂, ŷ) is an equilibrium to (A,B) with constant rewards α̂ and β̂ for player
I and II, respectively. This is true just for equilibria in non-pure strategies, since
in this case a reduction to the system (9) – (14) was used. Analogous statement
holds for Theorem 5 for the second player’s reward, and in Theorem 6 whenever
non-pure strategy is considered. However, α̂ and β̂ do not determine the players’
payoffs and need not be constant as long as we deal with pure strategies (for player
I in Theorem 5 or for both players in Theorem 6); see Example 1.
Theorem 5 (Strong equilibrium in pure and non-pure strategy). A pair
(x̂, ŷ) is a strong equilibrium consisting of pure strategy x̂ and a non-pure strategy ŷ
if and only if there is some α̂, β̂ ∈ R, û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n solving the system
eTx = 1, x ≥ 0, (21)
eT y = 1, y ≥ 0, (22)
αe− L(A)u ≤ Ay, Ay ≤ αe+ L(A)(e− u), (23)
eTu = m− 1, (24)
βe− L(B)v ≤ BTx, BTx ≤ βe, (25)
x+ u ≤ e, (26)
y + v ≤ e. (27)
P r o o f . Let x̂ ∈ Rm, ŷ ∈ Rn, α̂, β̂ ∈ R, û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n be a solution of
the system (21) – (27), and let A ∈ A and B ∈ B be arbitrarily chosen. Due to (24)
and (26), x̂ is a pure strategy, i. e., x̂ = ek for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Put α̃ := (Aŷ)k.
Then
α̃e− L(A)û ≤ Aŷ.
Moreover,
(Aŷ)k = (α̃e)k,
and for i 6= k we have according to (23)
(Aŷ)i ≤ (Aŷ)i ≤ (α̂e)i = α̂ ≤ (Aŷ)k ≤ (Aŷ)k = α̃ = (α̃e)i.
Thus,
α̃e− L(A)û ≤ Aŷ ≤ α̃e,
proving (11). The inequalities (12) hold true as
β̂e− L(B)v̂ ≤ BT x̂ ≤ BT x̂ ≤ BT x̂ ≤ β̂e.
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So x̂, ŷ, α̃, β̂ ∈ R, û and v̂ is a solution to the system (9) – (14), and therefore (x̂, ŷ)
is a strong equilibrium.
Conversely, let (x̂, ŷ) be a strong equilibrium, let x̂ = ek, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, be a
pure strategy, and let ŷ be a non-pure strategy. Let B ∈ B and define A′ ∈ A in this
way: a′kj = akj for j = 1, . . . , n, and a
′
ij = aij for i = 1, . . . ,m, i 6= k, j = 1, . . . , n.
By Theorem 3 there are some α̂, β̂ ∈ R, û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n satisfying
(9) – (14). We can assume that û = e− x̂. Then (24) holds true. Moreover, the kth
inequality in (11) reads
α̂ ≤ (A′ŷ)k = (Aŷ)k.
For i = 1, . . . ,m, i 6= k,
α̂− L(A) ≤ (Aŷ)i.
Thus we have
α̂e− L(A)û ≤ Aŷ.
Similarly we show the second inequality system in (23): The kth inequality
(Aŷ)k ≤ α̂+ L(A)
holds as L(A) is large enough, and
(Aŷ)i = (A
′ŷ)i ≤ α̂
is true for every i = 1, . . . ,m, i 6= k due to Theorem 3.
The remaining inequalities in (21) – (27) are satisfied as well; one can proceed as
in proof of Theorem 4. 
Remark 1. The system (21) – (27) contains m + n + 2 continuous variables and
m + n binary variables. From the computational point of view it seems better to
use the following condition; it consists of checking solvability of m mixed integer
systems (for k = 1, . . . ,m), each of which has n + 1 continuous variables and n
binary variables.
Equivalent formulation of Theorem 5 states that pure strategy ek and a non-
pure strategy ŷ form a strong equilibrium if and only if there is some β̂ ∈ R, and
v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n solving the system
eT y = 1, y ≥ 0,
eTi Ay ≤ eTkAy, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m, i 6= k,
βe− L(B)v ≤ BTx, BTx ≤ βe,
y + v ≤ e.
We have described all cases when a strong equilibrium consists of pure strategies,
non-pure strategies, or their combination. Each case needed its own test, which is
not convenient for processing. The next theorem covers all situations together and
proposes only one unifying test.
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Theorem 6 (Strong equilibrium). A pair (x̂, ŷ) is a strong equilibrium if and
only if there exists some α̂, β̂ ∈ R, γ̂, δ̂ ∈ {0, 1}, û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n solving
the system
eTx = 1, x ≥ 0, (28)
eT y = 1, y ≥ 0, (29)
αe− L(A)u ≤ Ay, Ay ≤ αe+ L(A)(e− u), (30)
Ay ≤ αe+ L(A)γe, (31)
(m− 1)γ ≤ eTu, (32)
βe− L(B)v ≤ BTx, BTx ≤ βe+ L(B)(e− v), (33)
B
T
x ≤ βe+ L(B)δe, (34)
(n− 1)δ ≤ eT v, (35)
x+ u ≤ e, (36)
y + v ≤ e. (37)
P r o o f . Let x̂ ∈ Rm, ŷ ∈ Rn, α̂, β̂ ∈ R, γ̂, δ̂ ∈ {0, 1}, û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n be
a solution of the system (28) – (37). If γ̂ = 0 and δ̂ = 0 then the variables solve also
(15) – (20) and so (x̂, ŷ) is a strong equilibrium in non-pure strategies by Theorem 4.
If γ̂ = 1 and δ̂ = 0 then the variables solve also (21) – (27) and so (x̂, ŷ) is a strong
equilibrium by Theorem 5. The situation when γ̂ = 0 and δ̂ = 1 is dealt with
accordingly. Eventually, if γ̂ = 1 and δ̂ = 1 then (x̂, ŷ) is a strong equilibrium in
pure strategies by Theorem 2: (32) and (35) imply that x̂ and ŷ are pure strategies,
i. e., x̂ = ei and ŷ = ej for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By (30) we
have aij ≥ α̂ ≥ akj for every k = 1, . . . ,m, k 6= i. By (33), bij ≥ β̂ ≥ bik for every
k = 1, . . . , n, k 6= j.
Conversely, let (x̂, ŷ) be a strong equilibrium. If it consists of non-pure strategies,
then there is a solution to (15) – (20). Putting γ̂ := 0 and δ̂ := 0 we get a solution
to (28) – (37). If x̂ = ek for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and ŷ is a non-pure strategy,
then there is a solution to (21) – (27). Putting γ̂ := 1 and δ̂ := 0 we get a solution
to (28) – (37). Eventually, if x̂ = ei and ŷ = ej are pure strategies then we put
û := e − x̂, v̂ := e − ŷ, α̂ := aij , β̂ := bij , γ̂ := 1 and δ̂ := 1. In this setting the
system (21) – (27) is satisfied. 




42 [21, 24] 21
[49, 52] [35, 38] [14, 17]
7 [77, 80] 35

 , B = AT .
In non-pure strategies, there exists just one strong equilibrium (x, y) with x =
y = (0.2857, 0, 0.7143)T and players’ rewards α = β = 27. That is, x, y, α, β,
u = v = (0, 1, 0)T and γ = δ = 0 form a solution to (28) – (37).
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In pure strategies, there is a unique strong equilibrium (x, y) with x = y =
(0, 0, 1)T . Players’ rewards are 35. The corresponding solution to (28) – (37) consists
of x, y, u = v = (1, 1, 0)T , γ = δ = 1 and any α, β ∈ [21, 35].
The interval game has no equilibrium in mixed pure and non-pure strategies,
even though (28) – (37) has a solution with α = 0 and β = 1. However, this solution
corresponds merely to pure-strategies equilibrium.
3. EQUILIBRIA SET
In this section we focus on the set of all equilibria for all instances of the interval
bimatrix game. Theorem 7 shows that every equilibrium is a solution of a particular
mixed integer linear system and vice versa.
Theorem 7. The set of all equilibria for all bimatrix games (A,B) with A ∈ A and
B ∈ B is described by the mixed integer linear system
eTx = 1, x ≥ 0, (38)
eT y = 1, y ≥ 0, (39)
αe− L(A)u ≤ Ay, Ay ≤ αe, (40)
βe− L(B)v ≤ BTx, BTx ≤ βe, (41)
x+ u ≤ e, (42)
y + v ≤ e, (43)
u ∈ {0, 1}m, v ∈ {0, 1}n. (44)
P r o o f . Let A ∈ A and B ∈ B and (x̂, ŷ) be an equilibrium of the bimatrix game
(A,B). By Theorem 3 there is some α̂, β̂ ∈ R, û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n solving
(9) – (14). Then
α̂e− L(A)û ≤ Aŷ ≤ Aŷ,
and
Aŷ ≤ Aŷ ≤ α̂e.
Thus (40) holds true and the other inequalities are satisfied accordingly.
Conversely, let x̂ ∈ Rm, ŷ ∈ Rn, α̂, β̂ ∈ R, û ∈ {0, 1}m and v̂ ∈ {0, 1}n be a
solution to (38) – (44). We define A ∈ A in the following way. For i with ûi = 0 we
have
(Aŷ)i ≤ α̂ ≤ (Aŷ)i.
If (Aŷ)i = (Aŷ)i then the ith row Ai,. of A can be arbitrarily chosen (in prescribed
bounds), otherwise we put





Then (Aŷ)i = Ai,.ŷ = α̂. For i with ûi = 1 we put Ai,. := Ai,.. Then α̂−L(A)ûi ≤
(Aŷ)i ≤ α̂. Similarly we define B ∈ B. Thus x̂, ŷ, α̂, β̂, û and v̂ satisfy the system
(9) – (14) and according to Theorem 3 the pair (x̂, ŷ) forms an equilibrium to the
bimatrix game (A,B). 
Due to Theorem 7, testing if (x, y) is an equilibrium of some instance is an easy
task. We put ui := 0 if xi > 0 and ui := 1 otherwise; likewise for v. Finally, check
solvability of the remaining bi-variate linear system (w.r.t. variables α, β ∈ R).
Theorem 7 also implies that the equilibria set consists of a union of finitely many
convex polyhedra. For any u ∈ {0, 1}m and v ∈ {0, 1}n the system (38) – (43)
describes a convex polyhedron, and so the equilibria set is composed of at most
2m+n convex polyhedra. Moreover, for any u ∈ {0, 1}m and v ∈ {0, 1}n the system
decomposes into two sub-systems: the first one consists of (38) and (41) – (42) with
variables β ∈ R and x ∈ Rm, and the second one comprises (39) – (40) and (43) with
variables α ∈ R and y ∈ Rn.
Proof of Theorem 7 reveals another useful aspect of the system (38) – (43). This
system describes not only all equilibria, but also the corresponding payoffs for both
players. If one desires to know lower and upper bounds for payoffs of player I for
instance, then it suffices to respectively minimize and maximize α over the system
(38) – (43). It means solving two mixed integer linear programs. However, when
restricted on certain u ∈ {0, 1}m and v ∈ {0, 1}n both problems reduce to linear
programs.
Example 2. Recall an interval bimatrix game (A,B) from Example 1. Using
Theorem 7 we obtain that the equilibria set consists of the following polyhedra:
1. Let u = v = (0, 0, 0)T . The convex polyhedron X described by (38), (41) – (42)
has vertices
(x1, β1) = (0.2857, 0, 0.7143, 27.0000),
(x2, β2) = (0.3714, 0.1000, 0.5286, 29.1000),
(x3, β3) = (0.3671, 0.0886, 0.5443, 28.7089),
(x4, β4) = (0.3676, 0.1029, 0.5294, 29.0294),
(x5, β5) = (0.3636, 0.0909, 0.5455, 28.6364).
The convex polyhedron Y associated (39) – (40) and (43) equals X . Hence the
Cartesian product X ×X yields a set of equilibria with corresponding rewards
for players.
2. For u = (0, 0, 0)T and v = (0, 1, 0)T we calculate the set of equilibria X ×
{(0.2857, 0, 0.7143, 27.0000)}. It is a subset of X ×X , so we can omit this case.
3. Situation u = (0, 1, 0)T and v = (0, 0, 0)T is symmetric to the previous and we
drop it, too.
4. For u = (0, 1, 0)T and v = (0, 1, 0)T we obtain the set of equilibria
{(0.2857, 0, 0.7143, 27.0000)}× {(0.2857, 0, 0.7143, 27.0000)}.
Interval Bimatrix Games 445
Also this case is covered by the first one.
5. Finally, let u = (1, 1, 0)T and v = (1, 1, 0)T . Herein we get only one equilibrium
(e3, e3) consisting of pure strategies. The reward is 35 for both players.
We enumerated all feasible cases; the other evaluations of u and v result in empty
sets of equilibria. Summing up, the total equilibria set (with the corresponding
rewards) is composed of union of the convex polyhedron X × X and the isolated
point (0, 0, 1, 35, 0, 0, 1, 35).
(Received April 14, 2010)
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